We investigate dynamic R&D for process innovation in an oligopoly where firms invest in cost-reducing activities. We focus on the relationship between R&D intensity and market structure, proving that the industry R&D investment monotonically increases in the number of firms. This Arrowian result contradicts the established wisdom acquired from static games on the same topic.
Introduction
We propose a dynamic analysis of the relationship between market power and R&D efforts, in order to reassess a well-known issue in the theory of industrial organization, that can be traced back to the debate between Schumpeter (1942) and Arrow (1962) . The so-called Schumpeterian hypothesis maintains that there exists an inverse relationship between the intensity of competition and the pace of technical progress. That is, according to Schumpeter, monopoly is the market structure that should ensure the fastest and largest technical progress. This relies upon the idea that monopoly ensures the highest profit level and therefore the larger internal sources for funding R&D activities. Exactly the opposite view is expressed by Arrow, since he focuses upon the replacement effect, according to which a monopolist should be induced to rest on his laurels, while a firm operating in a competitive environment should strive for new technologies or new products, in order to throw her rivals out of business.
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In order to assess this issue, we take a differential game perspective, proposing a dynamic version of a model first introduced in a static framework by d 'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) . We consider an oligopoly where n firms sell a homogeneous product and compete in quantities. Moreover, they also invest at each point in time in R&D for process innovation, i.e., reducing the marginal cost of production of the final good. The R&D activity is characterized by positive externalities, entailing that each firm receives a positive spillover from the investments carried out by all other firms in the industry.
Our model has the desirable property of being state-redundant or perfect, so that the open-loop solution is a Markovian equilibrium. We proceed in two steps. First, we characterize the individually optimal path of R&D investment for a given level of marginal production cost. Second, we obtain the steady state levels of investment and marginal cost. With respect to both the optimal path and the steady-state level of R&D investment, the following conclusions hold. The individual effort is always decreasing in the number of firms while the opposite holds for the aggregate R&D investments. This result has an Arrowian flavour, since as the degree of competition becomes tougher, the aggregate investment becomes larger. This is in sharp contrast 
The setup
We consider an oligopoly with n firms selling a homogeneous goods over continuous time, t ∈ [0, ∞) . In every instant, the market demand function writes as follows:
where Q −i (t) is the output supplied by all firms other than i. Each firm supplies the market through a technology characterized by a constant marginal cost, c i . Accordingly, her instantaneous cost function for the production of the final good is C i (c i , q i , t) = c i (t)q i (t). The marginal cost borne by firm i evolves over time according to the following kinematic equation:
where k i (t) is the R&D effort exerted by firm i at time t, while K −i (t) is the aggregate R&D effort of all other firms and parameter β ∈ [0, 1] measures the positive technological spillover that firm i receives from the R&D activity of the rivals. Parameter δ ∈ [0, 1] is a constant depreciation rate measuring the instantaneous decrease in productive efficiency due to the ageing of technology. Equation (2) is indeed a dynamic version of the linear R&D technology employed by d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988).
The instantaneous cost of running R&D activity is:
where b is a positive parameter. Throughout the game, firms discount future profits a the common and constant discount rate ρ > 0.
Firms adopt a strictly noncooperative behaviour in choosing both the output levels and the R&D efforts, each firm operating her own R&D division.
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The objective of firm i consists in maximizing discounted profits:
subject to the set of dynamic constraints (2) . The corresponding Hamiltonian function is:
where λ ij (t) = µ ij (t)e ρt is the co-state variable (evaluated at time t) associated with the state variable c j (t), and q, k, c are the vectors of control and state variables.
The open-loop solution
Here we characterize the Nash equilibrium under the open-loop information structure. As a first step, we prove the following result:
The open-loop Nash equilibrium of the game is subgame (or Markov)
perfect.
Proof. We are going to show that the present setup is a perfect game in the sense of Leitmann and Schmitendorf (1978) and Feichtinger (1983) . In summary, a differential game is perfect whenever the closed-loop equilibrium
collapses into the open-loop one, the latter being thus strongly time consistent, i.e., subgame perfect. 3 Consider the closed-loop information structure.
The relevant first order conditions (FOCs) are:
As a first step, observe that (6) only contains firm i's state variable, so that in choosing the optimal output at any time during the game firm i may disregard the current efficiency of the rival. That is, there is no feedback effect in the 3 The label 'perfect game' is due to Fershtman (1987) , where one can find a general tech- output choice. Conversely, at first sight there seem to be a feedback between the R&D decisions, as (7) indeed contains all state variables, at least for any positive spillover effect. 4 The core of the proof consists in showing that no feedback effect are actually present, even for positive spillover levels.
Taking the above considerations into account, the adjoint or co-state equations are:
captures the feedback effect from j to i, and partial derivatives ∂k * j (., t) /∂c i (t) are calculated using the optimal values of investments as from FOC (7):
These conditions must be evaluated along with the initial conditions {c i (0)} = {c 0,i } and the transversality conditions
Note that, on the basis of ex ante symmetry across firms, λ lj (t) = λ ij (t) for all l. Accordingly, from (11), we have ∂λ ij (t)/∂t = 0 in λ ij (t) = 0. Then, using this piece of information, we may rewrite the expression for the optimal investment of firm i as follows:
which entails that ∂k * i (., t) /∂c j (t) = 0 for all j 6 = i, i.e., feedback (cross-)effects are nil along the equilibrium path. Accordingly, the open-loop equilibrium is a degenerate closed-loop one, and it is strongly time consistent, or equivalently, subgame perfect. It is also worth observing that this procedure 
From FOCs (6-7) we have, respectively:
since λ ij (t) = 0 for all j 6 = i, at any t ∈ [0, ∞) . While (18) has the usual appearance of a standard Cournot best reply function, the optimal R&D effort in (19) depends upon i's co-state variable. Such expression can be differentiated w.r.t. time to get the dynamic equation of k i (t) :
with · λ ii (t) obtaining from (9) . Then, (20) can be further simplified by using
which obtains from (7). This yields:
The next step consists in imposing the symmetry conditions c j (t) = c i (t), k j (t) = k i (t) and q j (t) = q i (t) for all j, and solve the system of the best reply functions (18), yielding the Cournot-Nash output level of each firm:
which can be plugged into (22). Accordingly, we may simplify the dynamics of the R&D effort of any single firm as follows:
Imposing the stationarity condition · k = 0, we obtain:
where the superscript N stands for Nash equilibrium.
The steady state level of marginal cost c(t) can be found by solving:
which yields c = 0 and
All solutions in (27) are real if and only if δρ
If so, they also satisfy the requirement c ∈ [0, A ] . By checking the stability conditions, we may prove the following:
is the unique saddle point equilibrium.
Proof. Omitted for brevity.
Comparative statics
Now we focus on the interplay between market structure (as measured by the number of firms) and the industry incentive to invest in process R&D.
To this aim, we examine effect of a change in n on individual and aggregate R&D efforts, both along the equilibrium path (expression (25)) and in steady state.
This discussion revisits the debate between Schumpeter (1942) and Arrow (1962) . Their respective views can be summarized as follows. According to the Schumpeterian hypothesis, R&D investments and technical progress are positively related to the flow of profits and therefore we should expect to observe higher R&D efforts and a faster innovation process under monopoly than any other market form. Conversely, Arrow claims that the incentive to generate technical progress is negatively affected by market power, being then maximized under perfect competition. The Arrowian position relies upon the idea that innovation is more attractive for a competitive firm than for a monopolist who, by definition, can not improve his market power.
In order to assess this issue in the present model, we proceed as follows.
The aggregate R&D investments along the equilibrium path and in steady state are, respectively:
It is immediate to verify that:
which entails that the behaviour of the industry is clearly Arrowian. If instead we examine the individual investment, we obtain ∂k N (t) /∂n, ∂k ss /∂n < 0 everywhere. This entails that any increase in the number of firms brings about a decrease in individual R&D effort. This is caused by two facts: on the one hand, tougher market competition reduces profits and therefore that funds available to any given firm for conducting R&D activity; on the other, a larger population of firms means a larger amount of positive externality that any firm receives from the rivals. On the aggregate, a scale effect prevails, so that the overall expenditure of the industry is monotonically increasing in n.
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Hinloopen (2000) has solved the oligopoly equilibrium with n firms in the static case, finding that both aggregate and individual R&D efforts are non-monotone (first increasing and then decreasing) w.r.t. n. Under this respect, the static approach proves to fall short of appropriately accounting for the inherently dynamic nature of research and development which is not captured by multistage game modelling.
Concluding remarks
We have analyzed dynamic R&D investments for cost-reducing innovation in a Cournot oligopoly in order to evaluate the influence of market structure on R&D incentives.
The setup employed in the present paper is a dynamic version of the 
